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ABSTRACT 
 
Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd was an amalgamated company who sought to introduce a BEE 
element of ownership into its company in a tax efficient manner. Upon consulting their 
legal experts they were advised that the best manner in which they could achieve this 
objective was to enter into an amalgamation agreement in terms of section 44 of the ITA. 
At this particular time, the law was structured in a way in which it was possible to achieve 
this objective in a tax efficient matter, particularly because any distribution made by parties 
to the amalgamation transaction would be tax free. The problem however was that the tax 
collecting agency never intended the section 44 of the ITA amalgamation process to be 
STC free, and instead intended a temporary deferral thereof. To address this, the taxing 
authorities accordingly started putting mechanisms in place to limit the loss of such STC. 
On the 10 January 2007, SARS issued a public announcement stating that they planned to 
investigate certain corporate entities which had elaborate corporate structures that led to an 
impermissible loss of tax. On the 21 February 2007, the Minister of Finance stated that 
section 44 of the ITA, as it stood, allowed for a loss of STC as opposed to a deferral thereof, 
and that the taxing authorities intended on withdrawing such STC exemption in order to 
align it with their initial intention, and to further make such amendment retrospective to 
the date of such announcement. This was then once again cemented in the form of a press 
release on the part of SARS on that same day. Thereafter, this proposed amendment was 
submitted to Parliament in the Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill on 27 February 2007, 
and in May 2007, the Taxpayer completed its amalgamation transaction and achieved its 
BEE objective into its ownership. On the 7th June 2007 the Taxation Laws Amendment 
Bill was published together with an Explanatory memorandum which however no longer 
proposed the withdrawal of the STC exemption contained in section 44 of the ITA, but 
instead introduced a new addition into section 44 of the ITA. This provision now targeted 
a resultant company’s equity share capital and share premium, instead of the distribution 
of company income at the amalgamated company’s level. This new insertion was then 
promulgated into law on 8 August 2007 as section 44(9A) of the ITA. In complete 
difference to the initial proposal contained in the forewarning, the practical consequence 
   iii 
of section 44(9A) of the ITA was that the income which rolled over from the amalgamated 
company to the Taxpayer (the resultant company) had in the process changed its nature 
from revenue to capital which was caught up in the share premium account of the Taxpayer. 
Section 44(9A) of the ITA accordingly targeted any distribution made by the resultant 
company of this share premium. The Taxpayer’s problem in the present matter arose in 
2011 when SARS sought to tax the Taxpayer on its May 2007 completed transaction, 
particularly its distribution of its share premium at the time. In addition to this assessment, 
SARS furthermore also levied interest on such outstanding STC payment from 8 August 
2007, the date on which the final enactment was promulgated into law. This was that which 
accordingly prompted the Taxpayer to bring its matter before the High Court. Here, the 
prime relief sought by the Taxpayer was an order of constitutional invalidity, while the 
second order, couched as an alternative to the first was an interpretational argument which 
had the effect that section 44(9A) of the ITA did not apply to Taxpayer’s distribution when 
it was made because it was a completed transaction.  The gist of the Taxpayer’s 
constitutional issue requested of the court to declare that the provision did not pass 
constitutional muster to the extent of its retrospectivity. The court however dismissed the 
Taxpayer’s claims and held in favour of SARS. The paper seeks to analyse this case 
alongside the values of legal certainty, as espoused in the Rule of Law, and to consider the 
probability of success on the part of the Taxpayer if they opted to take the matter on appeal. 
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      CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1. Background and Context: 
  
Secondary Tax on Companies (hereinafter referred to as “STC”) was a tax 
introduced by section 64B and section 64C of the Income Tax Act1 (hereinafter 
referred to as the “ITA” or “the Act”), and applied in South Africa until 1 April 2012. 
It was aimed at taxing the net dividends of a company, that is, a company’s 
distribution of its profits to its shareholders. Such sections were however not aimed 
at taxing a company’s capital distributions, that is, the income the company derived 
from the sale of its assets at a value higher than the original amount it purchased 
such assets for.2 On this basis, para (f) of the definition of ‘dividend’ in section 1 of 
the ITA specifically excluded any distribution made by a company which 
represented a ‘reduction of a share premium account of a company’, as such ‘share 
premium’ was constituted of company capital, and not of company income.   
 
A further important section for the purposes of this paper is section 44 of the ITA. 
This is the ‘the group restructure provision’ or ‘the amalgamation transaction’ 
provision, which provides for roll over relief in the case of amalgamation 
transactions.3 Here amalgamation transactions are defined as being transactions 
                                                          
1Act 58 of 1962. 
2Brink, J and Brincker, E ‘Important Judgment on the Constitutionality of Retrospective Legislation’ 2017 Tax 
and Exchange Control Alert 3.  
3Botha, H and Marupen, C ‘Retrospective legislation: The Pienaar Brothers Case’ 2017 Siber Ink 11. 
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through which a company (the amalgamated company) disposes of all its assets to 
another company (the resultant company), with the end result being that the 
amalgamated company ceases to exist.4 
 
Section 44(9) of the ITA then takes this a step further to deal specifically ‘with 
amalgamation transactions where the resultant company issued shares to the 
amalgamated company, which shares the amalgamated company then distributed to 
its shareholders as a dividend in specie’.5  Ordinarily, in such a case, such dividend 
would have attracted STC, but because section 44(9) of the Act deems such 
distribution not to be a dividend for the purposes of STC, the distribution is exempted 
from STC.6 
 
In this regard, the Legislature intended the purpose of the exemption to render 
amalgamation transactions as STC neutral. Their reasoning behind such exemption 
was based on the assumption that the distributable income which was initially held 
by the amalgamated company would not attract STC, and merely be rolled over into 
the new resultant company, and then at a later stage if and when the resultant 
company chose to declare dividends on this income, would such distribution attract 
STC.7 The Legislature however overlooked the possibility of such ‘rolled over’ 
distributable income changing its character in the new resultant company and 
becoming share premium, which share premium would then avoid STC again if a 
distribution of it was made.8 This was exactly what happened in the present Pienaar 
                                                          
4Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and Another 2017 (6) SA 
443 (GP) at 7. 
5Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 26.  
6Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4. 
7Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4. 
8Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4. 
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Brothers’ transaction, where the resultant company issued shares to the amalgamated 
company, which the latter then distributed to its shareholders as a dividend in 
specie.9  
    
Practically, the way this so-called ‘loophole’ worked was that the amalgamated 
company would surrender its distributable income to the resultant company, in 
exchange for Newco shares being issued from the resultant company to the 
amalgamated company. Once such Newco shares were distributed to the 
amalgamated company’s shareholders would such distribution constitute a dividend, 
but be exempt from STC by virtue of section 44(9) of the Act.10 The resultant 
company would at this point have received the assets from the amalgamated 
company, but in its hands, the income would have changed its character from 
distributable income in the amalgamated company to share premium in the resultant 
company.11 If and when the resultant company decided to distribute from this share 
premium to its shareholders, would it constitute a capital distribution, and not a 
dividend, which would once again avoid STC as such distribution would not be a 
dividend as defined. Such amalgamation provision therefore allows a permanent loss 
of STC which would otherwise have been payable by the amalgamated company on 
its distributable income. 12 This was exactly what happened in the present case. 
 
1.2. Introduction:  
 
                                                          
9Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4. 
10Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4. 
11Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4. 
12Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4. 
Page 4 of 66 
 
Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd, an operating company, and also the Taxpayer in the 
present matter, entered into an amalgamation transaction in terms of section 44(9) of 
the ITA, with the bona fide intention of introducing a BEE element of ownership 
into its company in a tax efficient manner. At the time they entered into this 
amalgamation transaction, section 44(9) of the ITA contained a so-called ‘loophole’ 
that permitted a permanent loss of STC, as opposed to a mere deferral thereof, as 
intended by Legislature when drafting such legislation.13 However, a few months 
after their transaction was completed, the law was formally amended to close this 
so-called ‘loophole’. The problem in this particular matter however was that the 
content of this final amendment was considerably different to that was initially 
warned of in the prior warnings, which amendment was made retrospective to 21 
February 2007, the date on which the Minister of Finance announced his intention 
to close such so-called ‘loophole’ in his Budget speech, and thereafter in a press 
release statement again.14 In 2011 the South African Revenue Service (hereinafter 
referred to as “SARS”), the tax collecting authority in the present matter, sought to 
use this retrospective amendment to levy STC against the Taxpayer for making use 
of such so-called ‘loophole’’ in its May 2007 transaction.15 This ultimately prompted 
the Taxpayer’s application to the High Court. In this regard, South African law 
distinguishes between two types of retrospective legislation; retroactive legislation 
and retrospective legislation, which is explained as follows: 
[L]egislation is retroactive if it changes the law from what it was at a date in the past, 
typically if it provides that from a past date the new law will be deemed to have been 
in operation. Legislation is retrospective if it imposes new results in respect of a past 
event that is, if it operates forwards but looks backwards in that it attaches new 
                                                          
13Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 443.  
14Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 444.  
15Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 446.  
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consequences for the future of an event that took place before the legislation was 
imposed.16  
 
In the present case, the court, per Fabricius J, ruled that the retrospective legislative 
amendment was constitutional in that it was not a violation of the Rule of Law. The 
court further ruled that the retrospective amendment applied to transactions 
completed before the promulgation of the legislative amendment, and that there was 
no requirement that the Taxpayer ought to be given prior warning of the retrospective 
nature of the amendment – even though supposed ample warning had been afforded 
in this case. The judgment will be analysed in further detail in the chapters below.  
 
At this juncture it is important to understand the Rule of Law doctrine, and the values 
it proposes. In Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council,17 the Constititional court stated that the Rule of Law doctrine 
places limitations on the manner in which the state exercises the powers that has 
been conferred upon it. In President of the RSA v Hugo18 the Constitutional court 
also used the doctrine to hold that legislation may not be applied retrospectively, and 
in Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health of RSA19 the Constitutional court 
held that that legislation must be expressed in a clear, accessible and a reasonably 
precise manner. Taking this further, in the case of Zondi v MEC for Traditional and 
Local Government Affairs,20 the Constitutional court also stated that disputes should 
be adjudicated in accordance with the confines of the law and that judges must be 
                                                          
16Unitrans Passenger (Pty) Ltd t/a Greyhound Coach Lines v Chairman, National Transport Commission and 
Others 1999 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 7C.  
17 1998 12 BCLR 1458 (CC). 
18 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC). 
19 2005 6 BCLR 529 (CC). 
20 2005 4 BCLR 347 (CC). 
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accountable and not act arbitrarily. To summarise this, South Africa is a democratic 
state founded on the supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of law,21 where the  
[P]urpose [thereof] is to protect basic individual rights by requiring the government 
to act in accordance with pre-announced, clear and general rules that are enforced by 
impartial courrs in accordance with fair procedures. This requires state institutions to 
act in accordance with the law which means two things. The first is that the various 
organs of state  must obey. The second is that the state cannot exercise power over 
anyone unless the law permits it to do so. This means that there must be a law 
authorising everything the state does. If it acts without legal authority it is acting 
lawlessly, something that a constitutional democracy cannot permit.22  
 
The principle of legality, on the other hand, is the more sophisticated version of the 
rule of law, as it adds the procedural requirements to the exercise of state power that 
is absent on the principle of authority’s version stated above.23 “In this respect the 
principle of formal legality provides that the law must be general in nature; that it 
must be prospective and not retrospective; that it must be clear, open and relatively 
stable; and that it must be enforced by independent courts following fair 
procedures.”24 
 
A further important term that needs to be understood from the outset is the concept 
of a ‘loophole’, which is referred to  by both SARS and the Taxpayer  in formulating 
their arguments either for or against the retrospective application of legsilation 
throughout the case.25 For this reason, and in order to effectively engage and analyse 
the case, I will, as a start, need to  define what is meant by the term, as well as my 
                                                          
21 Section 1(c) of the Constitution of 1996 .  
22 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) at 10. 
23President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC).  
24Kruger Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal (2010) 468 475. 
25Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 435.    
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understanding of the use of the term in this particular case. From a legal perspective, 
one definition of the term ‘loophole’ is as follows: 
[I]t is an ambiguity or inadequacy in a system, such as law…, which can be used to 
circumvent or otherwise avoid the purpose, implied or explicity stated, of the system. 
In a loophole, a law addressing a certain issue exists, but can be legally circumvented 
due to a technial defect in the law.26  
 
Another definition of the term is that it is ‘an opportunity to legally avoid an 
unpleasant responsibility, usually because of a mistake in the way the rules or laws 
have been written’. 27  A further legal definition of the term is that it is‘a mistake in 
a law or set of rules that allow the rules to be broken’28.  
 
Furthermore, I believe that in trying to understand what is meant by the concept of a 
‘loophole’ in tax law, it is important to consider the term alongside the tax avoidance/ 
tax evasion distinction.   
 
[T]he former is generally taken to connote the lawful process of protecting one’s 
income and assets from erosion by taxation through measures which are within the 
bounds of the law, whereas the latter connotes the use of illegal means to escape, reduce 
or postpone tax for which penalties are prescribed under the Tax Administration Act29 
or stratagems which fall foul of one or more of the anti-avoidance provisions of the 
Income Tax Act.30  
 
                                                          
26“Loophole”. Revolvy. 2019. Available at https://www.revolvy.com/page/Loophole, accessed on 23 March 
2019.  
27“Loophole”. Cambridge dictionary. 2018. Available at 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/loophole, accessed on15 May 2018. 
28“Loophole”. IdioMeanings. 2018. Available at http://www.idiomeanings.com/loophole/, accessed on15 May 
2018. 
29Act 28 of 2011.  
30“Tax avoidance and evasion”. LexisNexis South Africa.2018. Available at https://www-
mylexisnexis-co-za.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/Index.aspx, accessed on 16 May 2018.  
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On this basis, I am of the view that a ‘loophole’ is not a mistake in law which allows 
the law to be broken. Instead, where the legal system has addressed a certain issue 
by formulating particular laws and rules regarding such issue, but where, despite 
such regulation, an ambiguity or inadequacy exists which results in the possibility 
that the implied or explicictly stated purpose of the provision can be avoided, then 
the taking advantage of such inadequacy is more alligned to the lawful tax avoidance 
principle, as opposed to the unlawful tax evasion principle. Planning one’s affairs to 
make effective use of such lawful tax avoidance mechanisms in order to pay the least 
amount of tax possible is every taxpayer’s right, and in accordance with the principle 
of legality and certainty as espoused under the Rule of Law doctrine.31 Such doctrine 
lies at the heart of our constitut ional dispensation, and requires that the law be 
certain, clear and stable at all times.32 This furthermore affords taxpayers the right 
to rely on the laws remaining what it was when they entered into a transaction, and 
that where new laws come into existence, that such laws will only be made 
prospective in its application. 33 This view accords with Emslie’s perspective that if 
taxpayers were required to take into account the Legislature’s actual intention, as 
opposed to merely what the legislation states, that it would in effect mean that 
taxpayers would be required to guess what statutes intended rather than what it 
actually stipulated. The further result of this would be that taxpayers would be 
required to base the structuring of their affairs on a hypothetical situation of such 
legislation being brought in line with that which the Legislature actually intended.34 
                                                          
31Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 435. 
32Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 435. 
33Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 435.  
34Trevor Emslie ‘Constitutionality of the Application of Retroactive Legislation to Completed Transactions’ 66 
(2017) April May The Taxpayer at 61. 
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Such an approach could never be in conformance with the values espoused by the 
Rule of Law doctrine.  
 
On the facts of the case, we can accordingly see that at the time the Taxpayer 
completed its transaction in May 2007 it was not liable for the payment of STC 
because section 44(9) of the ITA was formulated in a clear way that allowed a 
permanent loss of STC as opposed to a mere deferral thereof. 35At this time, the 
provisions regulating amalgamation transactions allowed taxpayers the lawful 
opportunity to bypass the payment of STC, and as such, the opportunity was not 
strictly speaking a ‘gap’ or ‘loophole’ in the law, it was the law. Similarly, the 
Taxpayer cannot be said to have acted in bad faith and that it took advantage of the 
existing law at the time as it was within the lawful bounds of what the law allowed 
at the time.  Instead, the Taxpayer’s business affairs required it to use the existing 
law to plan and structure its affairs in a manner which attracted the least amount of 
tax possible, and which achieved its ultimate BEE ownership objective, which was 
exactly what the Taxpayer did. 36 
 
1.3. Outline and scope: 
 
This paper will consider the probability of success of the Taxpayer’s case if it had 
taken the matter on appeal to the Constitutional Court. In doing so, only the issues 
concerning the constitutionality of the retrospective amendment will be considered.  
                                                          
35Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 452. 
36Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 443. 
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Accordingly, this paper is divided into four Chapters. Chapter one sets out the 
background and context relevant to understanding the facts of case, while Chapter 
two sets out such relevant facts of the case, the relevant announcement by the taxing 
authorities and the research issue.  
Chapter three then sets out my analysis of the court’s interpretational and 
constitutional issues, while Chapter four contains my conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 11 of 66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
2.1. Factual Background:  
 
Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd (the amalgamated company) was an operating company 
who needed to introduce a BEE element of ownership into its company in a tax 
efficient manner. However, in order to achieve this, their balance sheet statement 
needed to be slim so as to ensure that the share price was low and affordable for 
the prospective BEE owners to buy into.37  With this objective in mind, Pienaar 
Brothers (Pty) Ltd (the amalgamated company), acting upon legal advice, entered 
into an amalgamation agreement with Serurubele Trading 15 (Pty) Ltd in 
accordance with section 44 of the ITA (also referred to as ‘the group restructure 
provision’ or ‘the amalgamation transaction’). In terms of this amalgamation 
                                                          
37Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 442.  
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agreement, Serurubele Trading 15 (Pty) Ltd acquired all the assets of Pienaar 
Brothers (Pty) Ltd (the amalgamated company) as a going concern on 16 March 
2007, which acquisition was effectively backdated to 1 March 2007 in accordance 
with the Sale of Business Agreement between the parties.38 Once Pienaar Brothers 
(Pty) Ltd (the amalgamated company) disposed of its shares, being its only asset, 
to its shareholders, as a dividend in specie, it was liquidated in accordance with the 
requirements of the ‘amalgamation transaction’ provisions set out in the Act. 
Normally this distribution would have attracted STC, but because of the STC 
exemption espoused in section 44(9) of the ITA at the time, Pienaar Brothers (Pty) 
Ltd (the amalgamated company) was not liable for the payment of STC on such 
distribution.39 Once such distribution was effected,  Serurubele Trading 15 (Pty) 
Ltd thereafter changed its name to Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd (the Taxpayer), wh 
o for all intents and purposes was the resultant company of the whole amalgamation 
and the ‘vehicle for the envisaged amalgamation transaction’.40  
 
Furthermore, one of the conditions of the above mentioned amalgamation was that 
in partial settlement of the purchase price, the Taxpayer would issue shares to 
Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd (the amalgamated company) to an amount equal to the 
equity consideration of the assets sold to it.41 On this basis the Taxpayer’s share 
premium account was then further credited with the equity consideration less the 
face value of those shares, which amounted to R29 500 000.00 (the capital 
distribution). At this point, when we consider Pienaar Brothers’ (Pty) Ltd (the 
                                                          
38Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 443. 
39Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 443. 
40Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 443. 
41Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 443. 
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amalgamated company) initial objective of introducing a BEE element into its 
ownership, we see that although the structure was as it needed to be, the share price 
in the Taxpayer was still far too high for the prospective BEE buyers to afford as 
the Taxpayer, at this point, had all the assets and income of Pienaar Brothers (Pty) 
Ltd (the amalgamated company). Thus, in order to accordingly make the share 
price affordable, the Board of Directors of the Taxpayer resolved in terms of the 
relevant legislation to make a distribution of this R29 500 000.00 in its share 
premium account to its shareholders pro rata according to their shareholding, 
which distribution was made on 3 May 2007.42 This distribution was effected in 
terms of section 90 of the old Companies Act43, read with article 21A of the 
company’s Articles of Association. 44  
 
At this point, the Taxpayer achieved a slimmed down balance sheet and its existing 
shareholders acted in unison and sold 25.1% of its issued share capital to the BEE 
buyer, Naha Properties (Pty) Ltd, whereby the desired BEE ownership objective 
into the Taxpayer was achieved. This transfer of shares was confirmed by the 
Taxpayer’s directors on 7 May 2007.45  
 
As alluded to above, on 7 May 2007, when the distribution was effected and 
finalised, para (f) of the definition of ‘dividend’ in section 1 of the ITA excluded 
any amount distributed from the share premium account of a company (not being 
                                                          
42Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 443.   
43Act 61 of 1973. 
44Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 443. 
45Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 443. 
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profits previously capitalised to the share premium account).46 Section 44(9) of the 
Act further cemented and confirmed that this exemption applied to distributions in 
terms of an amalgamation transactions. Such dividend would ordinarily have 
attracted STC, but section 44(9) of the ITA exempted it from STC by deeming the 
provision not to be a dividend for income tax purposes. In this regard, the Taxpayer 
averred that on the 3 May 2007 when the distribution was made, the distribution 
was not a dividend as defined in the Act, and thus no STC was due and payable by 
it on the distribution. This was due to the fact that the distribution was made out of 
the Taxpayer’s share premium account, which share premium arose from the issue 
of ordinary shares at a premium over their par value.47  
 
The problem that led to the present matter arose when SARS imposed STC on the 
Taxpayer’s R29 500 000.00 distribution to its shareholders by retrospectively 
applying an amendment of the ITA, which in effect meant that SARS denied the 
exemption provided for in para (f) of the definition of ‘dividend’ at the time. SARS 
argument was that during the Budget speech of 20 February 2007, the Minister of 
Finance made known his intention to pass retrospective legislation to specifically 
deal with anti-avoidance arrangements relating to STC, particularly the loophole 
provided for by section 44 of the Act, which exemption permitted a permanent loss 
of STC instead of a deferral of tax, which was the reason behind the amalgamation 
provisions exception in the first place.48 This intention was further reinforced by 
SARS on the 21 February 2007 when it issued a press release in which the STC 
                                                          
46Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 444. 
47Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 443. 
48Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 446. 
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exemption for amalgamation transactions contained in section 44(9) of the ITA was 
withdrawn with immediate effect.49  
 
In the context of the definition of a ‘dividend’ in terms of section 1 of the ITA, the 
applicable law on 3 May 2007 at the time the Taxpayer’s distribution was made, 
such distribution did not constitute a dividend as defined, and therefore no STC 
should have been due and payable by it on such distribution. Such distribution was 
instead made out of the share premium of the Taxpayer, which share premium arose 
from the issue of ordinary shares at a premium over the par value.50 
 
2.2. Announcements by the Minister of Finance and SARS of the prospective change 
in closing the so-called 'loophole' created by section 44 of the ITA: 
 
As mentioned above, the net effect of the definition of ‘dividend’ in relation to 
distributions made out of a company’s share premium account and section 44(9) of 
the ITA was that no STC was triggered in consequence of the application of the 
amalgamation provisions of section 44 of the ITA. This was completely 
unacceptable to the SARS. To address this, a general warning was contained in the 
first public statement of the 10 January 2007, which warned taxpayers that the 
Treasury intended to close the so-called loophole in the ITA, and that ‘certain 
corporate transactions were ‘structured in such a way that they show complete and 
reckless disregard for tax morality and South African Tax Law’. 51 It gave notice 
                                                          
49Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 453. 
50Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 442. 
51South African Revenue Service ‘Aggressive tax structuring’ Press statement 2007, available at 
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Page 16 of 66 
 
that it was ‘to carefully examine these transactions in order to ensure that no 
impermissible tax loss occurs’, and that it should be noted that ‘the architects of 
certain tax aggressive structures will not be permitted to abuse South African tax 
provisions in ways clearly unintended by the legislature’.52 
  
Thereafter, on the 21 February 2007, the Minister of Finance in the 2007 Budget 
Speech made reference in general terms to an intention to pass retrospective 
legislation to deal with the loophole created by section 44 of the ITA, particularly 
relating to the loss of STC. At this point, no other specifics were provided. 53 
  
Taking the Minister of Finance’s announcement further, on 21 February 2007, the 
Commissioner for SARS issued a press release in terms of which he withdrew the 
STC exemption for amalgamation transactions contained in section 44(9) of the 
ITA with immediate effect as it created a permanent loss of STC instead of a 
deferral of tax. The particular statement read as follows:  
                    
[2]1 February 2007’: The STC exemption for amalgamation transactions contained in 
section 44(9) of the Income Tax Act, 1962, is withdrawn. This exemption permits a 
permanent loss of STC, rather than a deferral of tax, which is the intent of the 
amalgamation provisions.54   
 
 
In accordance with this proposed amendment, the compulsory distribution made 
by Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd (amalgamated company) would have been subjected 
                                                          
52Ibid.    
53Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 453. 
54South African Revenue Service ‘Explanatory Note: STC Reforms’ Press statement 2007, available at 
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to the payment of STC, and not the voluntary distributions made by the resultant 
company, the Taxpayer in the present matter. 55 
 
On 27 February 2007, SARS and the National Treasury released the Draft Taxation 
Laws Amendment Bill of 2007 for public comment, which in keeping with the 
press release of 21 February 2007, such Bill proposed the amendment of section 
44 of the ITA by the deletion of section 44(9) and (10) thereof, which amendments 
would have been deemed to come into operation on 21 February 2007, and which 
would apply in respect of any disposal of an equity share, or any deemed 
declaration of a dividend, by an amalgamated company (the amalgamated 
company) on or after the date.56  
 
It was at this point in early May 2007 that the amalgamation transaction, the 
distribution and the introduction of the BEE partner of the Taxpayer was 
completed. 57 
 
Then, on the 7 June 2007, the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill was published 
together with an explanatory memorandum. This Bill no longer proposed the 
deletion of sections 44(9) and (10) of the ITA, but instead proposed the insertion 
of section 44(9A) into the ITA, and that such amendment was to be made 
retrospective to 21 February 2007.58  The Explanatory memorandum relating to 
this insertion explained that section 44 amalgamations was meant to act as a 
deferral mechanism where all the assets and tax attributes from the amalgamated 
                                                          
55Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 468. 
56Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 444. 
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58Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 445. 
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company was to roll over to the resultant company, and that such resultant company 
should not only enjoy the tax benefits of the amalgamated company but also carry 
its tax burdens.59 The same theory was also to apply to STC. The distribution of 
acquiring company shares in an amalgamation transaction was accordingly free 
from STC. However, the profits of the amalgamated company did not roll over to 
the resultant company, and the net effect was that there was a complete STC 
exemption when the resultant company made a distribution of the former 
amalgamated company assets. On this basis, the effect of ‘section 44(9A) was that 
the amalgamated company’s profits are effectively rolled over to the resultant 
company, so that STC remains payable when the resultant company makes [a] 
subsequent distribution’.60  
    
Section 34(1)(c) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act61 (hereinafter referred to 
as “the Amendment Act”) was then promulgated into law on 8 August 2007, which 
inserted the new section 44(9A) into the already existing section 44 of the ITA. As 
explained in the Explanatory memorandum of the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 
this new insertion closed the existing loophole by deeming the resultant company’s 
equity share capital and share premium arising from any of section 44 
amalgamation transactions to ‘be profits not of a capital nature available for 
distribution to shareholders to the extent of any profits distributed by the 
amalgamated company ito subsection (9)’.62 The practical effect of this new 
amendment was that the amalgamated company’s profits would be rolled over into 
the resultant company so that STC would not affect the amalgamated company, as 
                                                          
59Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 445.  
60Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 445.   
61Act 8 of 2007. 
62Taxation Laws Amendment Act supra note 61.  
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initially intended, but instead roll over to Taxpayer, the resultant company, if and 
when it makes a subsequent voluntary distribution.  
 
More importantly for our purposes, however, was that:  
 
[S]ection 34(2) of the Amending Act provided that section 44(9A) was deemed to have 
come into operation on the 21 February 2007 and that it would be applicable ‘to any 
reduction or redemption of the share capital or share premium of the resultant company 
of its shares.63     
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Issues before the Court: 
 
The issue that led to the above dispute between the Taxpayer and the taxing 
authorities, the Commissioner of SARS and the Minister of Finance, was based on 
the STC assessment raised by SARS in an amount of R3 687 500.00 on the 
distribution of R29 500 000.00 of the Taxpayer out of its share premium account, 
made on 3 May 2007.64 At this time, such distribution did not constitute a dividend 
for the purposes of STC, but because the legislature not only amended section 44 
of the ITA on 8 August 2007 to close this so-called ‘loophole’ which caused a 
permanent loss of STC, and also backdated such amendment retrospectively to 21 
February 2007, the Commissioner was now able to raise an assessment on the 
distribution effected by the Taxpayer on 3 May 2007.65  
 
                                                          
63Taxation Laws Amendment Act supra note 61. 
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The Commissioner justified such assessment on the basis of the amended 
amalgamation provision, and the fact that prior to such distribution the Minister of 
Finance and SARS had generally indicated their intention to close the loophole 
created by section 44 of the ITA. The Taxpayer objected to such assessment, but 
such objection was disallowed by SARS. The Taxpayer’s application to the High 
Court was accordingly based on its disputing such STC assessment, where the court 
had to consider two main arguments the Taxpayer placed before it. The prime relief 
sought by the Taxpayer was an order of constitutional invalidity, while the second 
order, couched as an alternative to the first was an interpretational argument which 
had the effect that section 44(9A) did not apply to Taxpayer’s distribution when it 
was made. 66 To be more precise, these arguments were as follows: 
 
1. The Constitutional issue- That section 34(2) of the subsequently enacted 
Taxation Laws Amendment Act, which introduced section 44(9) 
retrospectively to 21 February 2007,  should to be declared inconsistent 
with the Constitution and invalid; or alternatively;67 
 
2. The Interpretational issue-  that the provisions of section 44(9A) of the ITA 
did not apply to the distribution made by the Taxpayer on 3 May 2007, or 
to its registered shareholders at that date pro rata according to their 
shareholding, of an amount of R29 500 000.00 out of the Taxpayer’s share 
premium account.68 
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For the purposes of convenience however, the court found it convenient to deal 
with the interpretational issue first.69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
3.1.Analysis of the Interpretational Issue: 
With regards to the interpretational issue, I am of the opinion that the court correctly 
dismissed this leg of the Taxpayer’s claim, and that the relevant provision should be 
read as applying to ‘any transaction’, without any exceptions.   
 
Despite the Taxpayer correctly citing the existence of a general presumption against 
retrospectivity in our law, the wording of section 34(2) of the Amendment Act70 
expressly states that the provision should be applied retrospectively from the 21 
February 2007. In this regard, despite the starting point in the process of 
interpretation being the wording of a provision, such interpretation does not stop at 
the perceived literal meaning of the words.71 Instead, to uncover the true meaning of 
the provision, and the intention of the legislature when drafting such legislation, the 
Purposive Approach requires us to consider the provision’s literal wording in 
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70Taxation Laws Amendment Act supra note 61. 
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conjunction with all the relevant and admissible context in which it operates, as well 
as the circumstances upon which the document came into being.72 Here, the express 
wording of the provision in line with the proposed purpose for which SARS sought 
to close the so-called loophole in the first place,73 the supposed numerous warnings 
given to taxpayers prior to the promulgation of section 34(2) of the Amendment Act, 
and SARS’s contentions that if they did not push for the so-called loophole to be 
closed that ‘there would be a real risk that the national fiscus would suffer extensive 
and permanent harm’ 74 should be taking into account. From this, it becomes clear 
that the court had no choice but to reach the conclusion that the amendment applied 
to any and all transactions, including completed transactions. This was so regardless 
of whether or not the retrospective application of legislation seemed unfair, as the 
court concluded that tax laws are not fair.75 On this basis, I am of the view that if the 
Taxpayer had to take the matter on appeal, the grounds for success on this 
interpretational leg would not be any more different to the initial outcome in the 
High Court.  
 
At this point however, it is important to point out that the subjective intention of the 
legislator when drafting such provision is what needed to be uncovered when 
attempting to interpret section 34(2) of the Amendment Act, alongside the relevant 
context and existing circumstances that brought the legislation into existence.76 As 
mentioned above, in support of the courts conclusion that the legislature intended 
the amendment to apply retrospectively to any and all transactions, the supposed 
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numerous warnings provided to taxpayers prior to the final addition of section 
44(9A) of the ITA was mentioned as well as the belief that if they did not push for 
such amendment that there would be ‘a real risk that the national fiscus would suffer 
extensive and permanent harm’.77  Here, despite the legislator subjectively intending 
the provision to apply retrospectively to any and all transactions because of these 
prior warnings, when we objectively consider this factor in analysing the case, it 
becomes clear that there was considerable distance between the supposed prior 
warnings and that which was finally enacted.78 While the warnings contained in the 
Budget Speech and the subsequent press release statement of 21 February 2007 
proposed the withdrawal of the exemption contained in section 44 of the ITA, the 
actual amendment retained this exemption and instead inserted a new section 44(9) 
into the ITA.79  
 
On this basis, the content and specificity of these warnings becomes important. 
Hattingh believes that the ‘challenge [in this matter] arose because of the generality 
and non-specific nature of the measure indicated in [the] public announcement and 
media release’.80  I, however, believe that despite the fact that SARS’s 
announcement of the 10 January 2007 was of a very general and non-specific nature 
in that it referred to certain corporate transactions which were to be ‘carefully 
examined in order to ensure that no impermissible tax loss occurred’,81 the Budget 
Speech and press release statement of 21 February 2007 was very specific and 
limited to the withdrawal of the exemption in section 44(9) of the ITA because it 
                                                          
77Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 471. 
78Johann Hattingh ‘Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and 
Another’ (2017) 20 ITLR 284 at 288. 
79Ibid. 
80Ibid.  
81South African Revenue Service op cit note 51. 
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permitted a loss of STC as opposed to a mere deferral thereof.82 As mentioned above, 
the withdrawal of this exemption would nonetheless have made sense and would 
have been expected, since but for this exemption, compulsory distributions made by 
amalgamated companies constitutes a dividend as defined, and would accordingly 
have attracted STC. 83 
 
However, when the final amendment was tabled, taxpayers discovered that 
something completely different to what was initially warned of in the press release 
statement had been promulgated into law. Instead of this mere withdrawal of the 
section 44(9) of the ITA exemption, the amendment inserted a new section 44(9A) 
into the ITA with a complete different purpose.84 This new provision now targeted 
any subsequent voluntary distribution of resultant companies’ share premium (which 
was of a capital nature), and which share premium was now deemed to be a dividend 
for income tax purposes. The result of deeming such share premium to be a dividend 
for income tax purposes was that tax became payable thereon when a resultant 
company decided to make a distribution thereof. 85  
 
Moreover, I believe that while the first warning contained in the public 
announcement of 10 January 2007 that warned taxpayers that SARS was planning 
on investigating certain corporate entities which had ‘elaborate structures’ that led 
to impermissible tax losses was of a general nature,86 both the warnings contained in 
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the Budget Speech and the subsequent press release statement of 21 February 2007 
was of a more specific nature.87 I am of the view that these specific warnings could 
be argued to have given taxpayers the impression that SARS had narrowed down 
their general warning of 10 January 2007 to the loss of dividend tax occasioned by 
the STC exemption contained in section 44(9) of the ITA.88  This would be a 
reasonable conclusion to reach on the part of taxpayer, particularly when a general 
statement is followed by a specific one, the latter can be construed as being a specific 
clarification of the first general statement.89 I further believe that the withdrawing of 
such exemption would furthermore have been the logical and reasonable response to 
the loss occasioned by section 44(9) of the ITA, and it was an action that both 
taxpayers and their legal advisors expected. At this point, if we liken this to the South 
African law of interpretation of statutes when trying to reason through legislation to 
uncover its true purpose, we are guided by the general context of legislation as a 
whole, the subject matter and the broad objects of the statute,90 and that when a 
general intention is followed by a specific intention, that this specific intention is 
paramount importance in indicating what is meant by the legislation.91 In this case, 
a general intention to curb ‘impermissible tax loss’ followed by a warning that the 
section 44 of the ITA created a permanent loss of STC, gives taxpayers the 
impression that this specific section was the problem which SARS was looking into 
when they warned of ‘impermissible tax loss’ in the context of elaborate corporate 
structures.    
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From this it becomes clear that the supposed prior warnings that needed to be taken 
into account when uncovering the true intention of the legislator when drafting such 
legislation, from an objective perspective, in no way gave taxpayers any proper 
warning that any subsequent voluntary distribution made by the resultant company 
of share premium would have been affected.92 This distribution was in any event of 
a capital nature, it was not a dividend as defined, and it rarely occurred. The only 
reason it occurred in the present matter was because the amalgamated company 
needed to achieve a slimmed down balance sheet so that the share price could be 
affordable for the prospective BEE buyers to buy into the Taxpayer.93 This 
affordable share price could furthermore only be achieved if the share premium of 
the Taxpayer was accordingly distributed to its pre-existing shareholders. 
 
Moreover, the second factor used in support of the court’s conclusion that section 
34(2) of the Amendment Act should be interpreted to apply to all transactions, 
including completed transactions, was the contention on the part of the   that if the 
so-called loophole was not closed that there would have been ‘a real risk that the 
national fiscus would have suffered extensive and permanent harm’.94 Here, we 
again see that although the legislature subjectively based its decision to make section 
34(2) of the Amendment Act applicable to all transactions retrospectively on its 
belief that if this was not done that it would result in a real risk to the national fiscus 
as the so-called ‘loophole’ allowed companies to avoid paying STC; when we 
objectively consider this factor we discover that this was not necessarily the case.  
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According to Hattingh, such contention was not backed by empirical data and instead 
based on hearsay.95 Fabricuis J also found it questionable that the existing law 
containing the so-called ‘loophole’ created ‘extensive and permanent harm’ to the 
fiscus, since the use of the term ‘harm’ presupposed ‘the loss of something already 
held’ and suggested that the fiscus was entitled to more tax than the law provided for 
at the time. He went further to state that this principle could not be applied to tax law 
as the fiscus was not entitled to more tax than what the law provided for at the time.96 
In line with Hattingh and Emslie’s argument, Fabricuis J stated that even if harm 
was a legitimate consideration, that there was no suggestion that in the five years 
since the enactment of section 44 of the ITA that any taxpayer had used it or that the 
fiscus suffered any loss.97 If as SARS contended, the Shoprite/Brait transaction in 
late 2006 was the primary driver for the amendment, no actual loss of STC took 
place, and no such prejudice to the fiscus existed anymore.98 Also, there was no 
concrete evidence of any other amalgamation transaction took place in the period 
between February 2007, the date of the initial formal warning, and August 2007, the 
date of the final enactment, nor that there was any ‘flood of section 44 amalgamation 
transactions’ during this time.99   
 
Taking this argument further, Emslie and Hattingh’s commentaries are quite relevant 
here. Hattingh questions whether the Rule of Law could really mean and allow 
organs of state who draft legislation to act on hearsay to enact overbroad measures 
to achieve their objectives, and whether this is a rational response by the legislature 
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at all.100 He further questions whether this could mean that as soon as members of 
the legislature are able to make such reasonable inferences based on hearsay (with 
no empirical data to support their assumptions), that the Rule of Law no longer had 
any constraining effect on the decision to enact retrospective law; and whether this 
meant that the Rule of bad law is possible as long as the organ of state drafting the 
law is able to show a thin basis for rationality in the decision to draft the law, 
however ill-informed.101 In this regard, and although I do agree with Hattingh’s 
contention that the anticipated tax avoidance that brought about the use of such 
retrospective amendment never in fact materialised, and that such tax avoidance 
concerns were brought about by hearsay, I do not believe that the legislature should 
always need to prove an actual financial loss supported by empirical data to be able 
to address loopholes in the law.102 In justification for this point, I rely on contentions 
put forward by SARS and accepted by Fabricius J that ‘parliament is not required 
to wait for iron-clad evidence before it enacts to prevent damage to the fiscus’ and 
that it would be perfectly appropriate for parliament to act proactively to avoid any 
such damage feared.103 To expect the opposite, would be too rigid a route to comply 
with the flexibility needed by parliament to govern effectively and to ensure the 
effective running of South Africa.  In any event, the problem in this particular case 
was not the fact that the legislature chose to amend section 44 of the ITA without 
empirical data, but rather that they were allowed to do so in a manner which violated 
the highly held principle of legal certainty.  
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In CSARS v NWK Ltd104 the court set out this constitutional right to legal certainty 
in the law and that it would be prejudicial and unfair to taxpayers to impose tax ex 
post facto on completed transactions, ‘since taxpayers have a well-established right 
to know what the law proposes and then to arrange their affairs in a manner that 
would attract the least amount of tax possible’.105 On this basis, Emslie similarly 
provides compelling criticisms of Fabricius J’s judgment of the case, where he 
disagrees with the court’s reasoning and decision. He began such criticism by stating 
that the application of retrospective legislation to completed transactions displayed 
a clear disregard of the taxpayer’s rights under the Constitution, particularly the 
principle of the Rule of Law, and that such disregard signifies and embodies an 
absence of tax morality.106 According to Emslie, tax authorities are quick to 
complain about the absence of tax morality on the part of taxpayers, but forget that 
the same principle applies where such tax authorities argue for the retrospective 
application of legislation to completed transactions.107 On this basis and in line with 
both Hattingh and Emslie’s commentary, it cannot be a reasonable response on the 
part of the legislature, in a constitutional democracy such as South Africa, that the 
organs of state responsible for drafting legislation is allowed to violate the principle 
of legality by enacting retrospective legislation based on a supposed warning which 
did not actually warn taxpayers of that which was finally enacted. Why were 
overbroad measures used to achieve the objective of closing the so-called loophole 
contained in section 44 of the ITA retrospectively when the problem could have been 
addressed prospectively instead? This latter route would have been more in 
conformance with the values espoused in the Rule of Law, and would have afforded 
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taxpayers the opportunity to know what the law proposed, and then be able to arrange 
their affairs accordingly.   
 
In line with this argument and Fabricius J’s reasoning in the case, Hattingh criticises 
the approach taken by the relevant taxing authorities as SARS made no mention of 
the possibility of assessing the Taxpayer’s transaction on the basis of using the anti-
avoidance measures already provided for the ITA, such as the statutory GAAR, nor 
was the feasibility into such an approach even inquired into by the relevant 
Parliamentary bodies.108 On the basis, I agree with Hattingh when he questions 
whether it would it would not be more rational to have first inquired into the 
feasibility of this route, and then to wait and see if the revenue administration was at 
all capable of using its already wide powers provided for under the statutory general 
anti avoidance rule to address actual tax avoidance arrangements, or was such an 
option not considered at all because it was common cause that the factual 
background suggested that the completed transactions were bona fide, and was 
entered into merely to introduce BEE into its ownership, and not to evade tax.109  As 
mentioned above, I believe this criticism to hold much relevance, particularly 
because of the general nonconformist and unsophisticated manner in which the court 
dealt with the pivotal constitutional value of the Rule of Law. I believe that the 
relevant authorities should perhaps have looked into the feasibility of using the anti-
avoidance provisions already provided for, prior to just opting for the extreme 
approach of making the amendment retrospective. I say this because from the 
Pienaar Bros case it becomes clear that there was no other amalgamation 
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transactions that took place between the period of the press release warning and the 
formal amendment on 8 August 2007, and that if it was possible for the relevant tax 
authorities to ‘catch’ the Taxpayer by using already existing anti-avoidance 
provisions, then this should rather have been the starting point. No such attempt or 
inquiry into this route was even made. These possible alternative routes becomes 
even more important in the light of the already existent problem of tax morality in 
South Africa, as indicated by Emslie in his critique of the case.110 Having researched 
this concept further, and based on Emslie’s correct criticism statement that SARS is 
always quick to use tax morality to further their agenda, I agree that taxpayers need 
to be given hope in the system again, and that the retrospective application of 
legislation could have been avoided altogether if the statutory anti-avoidance 
provisions had been considered. Tax morality is an obvious concern and a concept 
that has gained much popularity lately, and was even mentioned by our current 
President Rhamaposa in his 2018 State of the nation address.111 The Commissioner 
of SARS is also in particular is known to have referred our courts to the concept on 
numerous occasions, an example of which was in the case of Hindry v Nedcor Bank 
and another112 where the Commissioner stated that:  
 
[T]he (Income Tax) Act provides, to a great extent, for a system of self-assessment 
insofar as the South African Revenue Service has to rely on taxpayers for information 
on which final assessments are based. The necessity, therefore, of a high tax morality 
is obvious.  
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Furthermore, while I do believe that it is the mandate of SARS to collect as much 
tax as legally possible for the effective running of South Africa, in accordance with 
Hattingh’s commentary,113 as with any organ of state, I believe that accountability 
and transparency is very important to ensure that there is no use of arbitrary power.  
In a taxation context, the Rule of Law acts as the fundamental constraint against the 
abuse of state power, and it is given practical effect by regulating how the state uses 
its coercive power to raise funds from its citizens.114  On this basis, I believe that if 
the taxing authorities had been made aware of the fact that section 44(9) of the ITA 
allowed for a permanent loss of STC as opposed to a mere deferral thereof through 
the Shoprite/Brait transaction in late 2006, that they then had ample time to 
thoroughly investigate the different ways that this loss of tax could occur, and to 
develop effective means in which such possibilities could be addressed. If this had 
been done, would it have been possible for the taxing authorities to announce a well-
thought through warning (general or specific) in order to properly put taxpayers on 
guard for perhaps an ‘impermissible’ loss of tax occasioned by section 44 
amalgamation transaction provision generally. If this were the case, would I be more 
inclined to entertain SARS’s contention that the Taxpayer should have taken heed 
of such warnings when planning its affairs, and that they should retrospectively be 
held liable for the tax imposed ex post facto on its completed transaction.   
 
However, despite the fact that no organ of state’s power is unrestrained, the Pienaar 
Bros case makes it appear as if SARS is conveniently allowed to make any general 
and specific public statements, without having thoroughly investigated an issue at 
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hand, and regardless of whether or not the effect of such warning would conflict with 
the principle of legal certainty. It appears further as if SARS will then receive 
favourable treatment from the courts because of the assumption that the loss of tax 
would result in a real risk that the national fiscus would suffer extensive and 
permanent harm. Also, I do agree with Hattingh’s comment that the judgment creates 
the perception that the ‘Rule of Law in the context of the case exists to protect the 
state against corporate citizens under the heading ‘Retrospective legislation, a 
necessary tool for modern government’.115  
 
Surely, this cannot be true in a democratic state such as South Africa. Surely 
representatives of the taxing authorities’ should be responsible and accountable for 
their actions. If SARS was concerned with the ‘impermissible tax loss’ when they 
made the statement on 10 January 2007, and then on the 21 February 2007 they 
narrowed down such concern to the loss of STC occasioned by section 44 of the ITA 
and that they intended on remedying it by withdrawing the exemption contained in 
section 44(9) of ITA, then they should be held to the warning they gave.  
 
Having said this however, while I do acknowledge the need for flexibility to allow 
for the true inclusion of recommendations attained through the process of public 
participation, I believe that if the press release and Budget Speech warnings were 
thoroughly thought through, that the amendment in the present case could have been 
giving effect to without violating the principle of the Rule of Law. Also, I believe 
that if the court on this occasion took the strict approach and afforded the Taxpayer 
protection under the Rule of Law and the principle of legal certainty that it would 
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act as a warning to SARS to act responsibly and accountably to the decisions they 
make, particularly when it comes to something as serious as making laws 
retrospective based on warnings given in a press release statements.  As mentioned 
above, I agree with Emslie’s contention that taxpayers need to be given hope in the 
system again, particularly because of the already existent problem of tax morality.116 
This concept is in any event based on the social contract between taxpayers and the 
state, where the state depends on the obedience and conformity of the taxpayers to 
pay their taxes and to act in accordance with the law, so that the state can govern 
effectively.117 Here, ‘taxpayers and citizens are generally allowed to claim the 
protection of the Rule of Law principle because they accept this undisputed authority 
of the state’. 118  
 
As discussed above, another point which I found very interesting was the contention 
by Emslie that the judgment espoused an absence of tax morality, a concept that 
seemed to have gained much popularity lately. This concept of ‘tax morality’, and 
the absence thereof, can also be viewed in accordance with that which Emslie 
highlighted in this commentary, particularly the manner in which taxpayers who 
made use of the so called ‘loophole’ were described as being ‘unscrupulous 
taxpayers’.119  In this regard, I agree with Emslie’s contention that the fault does not 
lie with taxpayers when they are well within their rights to arrange their affairs in 
such a way that they pay the least amount of tax possible. Tax avoidance in this 
regard is not unlawful, and the Taxpayer did not ‘exploit’ or ‘undermine’ the ITA 
and its provisions by acting within the boundaries set by law. In such an instance, 
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one would think it reasonable for taxpayers to complain if the tax authorities decided 
to ‘take remedial action’ against their lawful conduct. Also, Fabricius J also 
commented in a similar vein to the SARS’s argument that if the legislation was not 
made retrospective, that the fiscus would suffer ‘extensive and permanent harm’, by 
stating that ‘harm’ in this sense ‘presupposes the loss of something already held, 
[and this] suggests that the fiscus is in fact entitled to more tax than the law 
provides’.120  This can never be true. Furthermore, reference can be made to the first 
public statement of the 10 January 2007 which warned taxpayers that the Treasury 
intended to close the loophole in the ITA, and that ‘certain corporate transactions 
were ‘structured in such a way that they show complete and reckless disregard for 
tax morality and South African Tax Law’. 121 It gave notice that it was ‘to carefully 
examine these transactions in order to ensure that no impermissible tax loss occurs’, 
and that it should be noted that ‘the architects of certain tax aggressive structures 
will not be permitted to abuse South African tax provisions in ways clearly 
unintended by the legislature’.122  
 
Here, and in accordance with Emslie’s contentions, the use of the concept of ‘tax 
morality’ was conveniently cited by the taxing authorities as supporting their claim, 
and the ‘loss’ referred to is described as being ‘impermissible’, which regardless of 
whether or not the initial section 44 of the ITA was intended to result in a tax loss, 
such loss, in terms of the bounds of the law, can never be impermissible. Tax 
avoidance in this regard is always the lawful option.123 From this, I completely agree 
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with Emslie’s statement above, as it seems as if all those who are on the side of the 
relevant taxing authorities, need to be reminded that they too are bound by the Rule 
of Law and that their actions should also embody the necessary ‘tax morality’ they 
so often advocate.    
 
Furthermore, in trying to make sense of the Fabricuis J’s unorthodox application of 
the Rule of law in the present matter, Hattingh provided a further interesting 
interpretation thereof and suggested that the judgment could be read as implying that 
‘a special approach applies in perceived tax avoidance cases that exonerates the 
state from the confines of the rule of law to permit the use of retroactive taxing 
measures’, of which there would be several obvious concerns with.124 As a start, he 
explains that such retroactive taxing measures should only be used as an exceptional 
measure, and the conditions for its invocation needs to be clearly stipulated and 
explained. To Hattingh, this would arguably require a development in the law ‘which 
is reserved only for the highest courts pursuant to the rule of precedent’. 125 This 
argument is accordingly of particular importance against the problematic reality of 
tax morality and the importance of the principle of legal certainty. This 
understanding would also be more in conformance with the right to legal certainty 
as it would provide taxpayers with the knowledge of what the law proposed prior to 
them planning their affairs.  
 
3.2.Analysis of the Constitutional Issue:  
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With regards to the Taxpayer’s constitutional issue, I am of the opinion that the court 
incorrectly dismissed this leg of the Taxpayer’s claim, and that on the facts of this 
particular case, that section 34(2) of the Amendment Act, to the extent of its 
retrospectivity, is invalid on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the Rule of law.   
 
The starting point of this leg of the analysis was that section 1(c) of the 
Constitution,126 read with section 2 thereof, makes the Rule of Law one of the 
foundational values of our Constitution, and that any law inconsistent with it is 
invalid.127 Here the Taxpayer argued that the Rule of Law obliges government to act 
in accordance with laws that are reasonably clear, accessible and prospective in their 
operation, and that laws should not be structured in wide terms, but rather be precise 
and clear, otherwise a decision by discretion is imported.128  This is particularly the 
case because in line with the case authority postulated in Dawood,129 taxpayers have 
no fair chance of knowing and predicting their rights and the manner in which they 
would need to regulate their affairs to pay the least amount of tax possible if laws 
are applied retrospectively to the disadvantage of people. Hattingh similarly uses this 
important component of the Rule of Law doctrine, the right to legal certainty, in his 
argument and defines it as follows: 
[L]egal certainty is essential to an ordered society and manifest in several ways. It 
impacts the content of laws so that legislators are required by the rule of law to design 
legislation that enables citizens to know and to predict their rights on an upfront basis 
with precision. Further, certainty under the rule of law suggests that laws should take 
effect for the future, otherwise citizens will not be able to know what their rights are or 
how to plan their conduct.130 
                                                          
126The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
127Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 472.  
128Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 472. 
129Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 936 (CC) at para. 47. 
130Johan Hattingh op cit note 78 at 288.   
Page 38 of 66 
 
 
However, as mentioned above despite the starting point being the inquiry of whether 
or not the retrospectivity would amount to the contravention of the Rule of Law 
principle itself, Fabricius J correctly qualified this general principle to state that the 
court was nevertheless entitled to investigate into the substance, nature and form of 
the transaction, which would not conflict with the Rule of Law values at all.131 In 
addition to this, the contextual circumstances that surrounded the statute and the facts 
that gave rise to it needed to be taken into account as well. This furthermore accords 
with the view espoused by both Fabricuis J and Davis J who expressed that such 
context is everything in legal disputes.132 For Davis J while a vaguely drafted press 
release could in one context be argued to be not to be justified, the same press release 
could under different circumstances, be justified. This is of particular importance 
against the backdrop of fluidity and flexibility generally demanded by our economic 
circumstances.133  
 
At this point, I need to stress that I share some of the concerns highlighted by 
Hattingh and Emslie relating to the court’s unusual reasoning and nonconformist 
approach to the very highly held Rule of Law doctrine espoused within our 
Constitution and the lack of tax morality therein.134 Here, Hattingh’s first criticism 
of the case was the non-conformist approach to the Rule of Law taken by the court.135 
In this regard, I agree with Hattingh when he states that the case made it appear as if 
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the Rule of Law had a completely different role to play than that of acting as a 
regulator of the uneven power relationship between citizens and the state, which 
principle is ultimately that which should prioritize a standard of order and fairness 
between the two.136 Hattingh takes this perception further and states that the 
judgement makes it appear that the Rule of Law, in a tax context, is there to protect 
the state against the corporate citizens, and that such protection is different 
depending on whether it is a weaker natural person claiming its protection or a 
stronger corporate entity. 137 
 
I furthermore also agree with Hattingh that another unusual feature of the judgement 
relates to the manner in which the court applied the review standard in trying to 
establish whether the Rule of Law principle was infringed and that it was as if the 
court assumed that public interests outweighed the private interest in this case.138 
Similarly to Dicey et al, as mentioned by Hattingh, I was left with the impression 
that the Rule of Law was a mere adornment, and that it needed to squirmed into 
whatever was needed to protect the ‘fiscus’ and the public interest. 139 This can be 
seen through statements made by Fabricuis J such as ‘there is nothing internal in the 
rule of law which renders retrospective legislation per se unconstitutional’ (at 
[102]), which directly contradict orthodox articulations by courts of the rule of 
law,140 as in Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-
Aschaffenburg AG141 for instance, where it was stated as follows: 
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[L]ord Diplock said the following about the rule of law under the constitution of the 
United Kingdom: ‘The acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle 
requires that a citizen, before committing himself to any course of action, should be 
able to know in advance what are the legal consequences that will flow from it.’ The 
late Lord Bingham wrote in his twilight years that ‘[...] the core of the existing 
principle of the rule of law: that all persons and authorities within the state, whether 
public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publically 
made, taking effect generally in the future and publically administered in the courts’ 
(T Bingham, The Rule of Law (London 2010) 37) and the South African 
Constitutional Court has held that: ‘A person should be able to know of the law, and 
be able to conform his or her conduct to the law’ (President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), para [102]).142 
 
 Similarly, after having analysed the case I was also shocked by the bold approach 
taken by Fabricius J in stating that no warning needs to be given by the state to 
citizens of the possibility of retroactive tax legislation.143 From my point of view, 
this ‘warning’, or the absence of thereof, was that which formed the most 
important determinant of whether or not the Rule of Law doctrine was breached 
in the present case. In disagreeing with Fabricuis J, I am of the view that to state 
that no warning needs to be given to citizens of the possibility of retroactive tax 
legislation is unfair, as it is not just law that was unknown to the taxpayer but also 
law that was not in existence at the time the Taxpayer in question undertook the 
action.144  Based on the very high value given to the principle of the Rule of Law, 
I could understand the need for flexibility and having a rebuttable presumption 
against retroactive legislation, but to state that no warning whatsoever needed to 
be given to warn taxpayers that they should anticipate a change clearly goes 
against the right to legal certainty.  
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With this principle in mind, Emslie similarly criticises the judgment and states 
that the application of the retroactive tax laws are in breach of the Rule of Law 
doctrine and that it disregards taxpayers’ rights under such doctrine, particularly 
the right to legal certainty.145 He goes further to state that this breach of the Rule 
of Law doctrine is even more serious when a warning given by press release that 
a ‘loophole’ in the law will be closed, as it falls short of the high standards 
espoused in our Constitution.146 Davis J however criticizes these contentions as 
very strong criticisms, particularly the latter one.147  
 
In considering these opposing contentions, my stance is one that lies in between 
these two views. While I do agree with Emslie that the retrospective application 
of legislation in this particular case constituted a breach of the rights afforded to 
Taxpayer under the Rule of Law,148 I do not extend my view to generally state 
that warnings given by press release that ‘loopholes’ will be closed 
retrospectively will always contravene the Rule of Law principle.149 Here, I agree 
with Fabricuis J that the contextual circumstances that surrounded the statute and 
the facts that gave rise to it, as well as the substance, nature and form of the 
transaction needed to be taken into consideration when considering whether the 
Rule of Law had been breached.150 Taking this further, I am of the view that in 
addition to these considerations, that future matters should be decided on a case-
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to-case basis so as to ensure that our courts do not act blindly and merely apply 
existing precedents which do not necessarily conform with the values espoused 
by the Rule of Law doctrine. With having said this though, I do acknowledge the 
principle of stare decisis, and the issues which applying future matters on a case-
to-case basis could bring.  Also, I agree with both Fabricuis J and Davis J that our 
economic circumstances generally demand a degree of fluidity.151 
 
Here, in agreeing with the Taxpayer’s contentions before the court and taking into 
account this demand for fluidity and flexibility, I am of the view that while the 
Rule of Law does lead us to a strong presumption that retrospective tax statutes 
are constitutionally invalid, that there could exist exceptions to this rule that 
would not necessarily attract constitutional sanction.152 In disagreement with 
Emslie’s strict approach, I am accordingly of the opinion that warnings given by 
press release that so-called ‘loopholes’ will be closed retrospectively will not 
always violate the Rule of Law principle per se. There could exist exceptions 
which will not infringe on taxpayers’ right to legal certainty. In this regard, I 
found Davis J’s contentions that the context is everything in legal disputes 
relevant.153 Here he found it difficult to understand why retroactive legislation 
‘which falls within the scope of a clearly worded press release and a draft Bill’ 
cannot be justified under the circumstances of the case.154 This was especially 
problematic if there exists a so-called loophole in our tax legislation which would 
result in great economic loss to our fiscus if left open, and which would provide 
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taxpayers with the opportunity to abuse the existing ‘loophole’ if it was not closed 
retrospectively.155 According to Davis J this could result in the government falling 
short of the amount of revenue it budgeted for and would force government to 
borrow more money. This would have a jeopardising long-term effect on the 
economy, as well as detrimental consequences on the society at large. On this 
basis, while I do agree with Davis J’s contention that a carefully drafted press 
release warning given to taxpayers that an existing ‘loophole’ in the law would 
be closed retrospectively (to the date of such warning) could in certain 
circumstances still pass legal muster, I do not believe that on the facts of this 
particular case, that this was the case. Unlike Davis J, I do not believe that a fair 
balance was struck in the present case, particularly because of the considerable 
difference between the initial warning and final enactment. 156 
 
On the facts of this particular case however, I am of the view that if in accordance 
with SARS press release of 10 January 2007,157 SARS public announcement in 
the Minister’s Budget Speech and the subsequent press release statement of 21 
February 2007 continued to warn taxpayers that SARS was concerned with a 
general loss of tax occasioned by elaborate corporate structures which was 
unintended by the legislature, and narrowed down this to consideration of section 
44  of the ITA generally (and the actual objective of the legislature in the first 
place), that I would have been more inclined to side with the taxing officials that 
the Taxpayer should be held liable for the loss of tax allowed through the use of 
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section 44 of the ITA, regardless of whether or not the income had changed its 
nature and been converted into capital. In my opinion, such a warning would have 
sufficiently put taxpayers on guard that the taxing officials were intending to align 
this section with the legislature’s actual intention when drafting the provision, 
that is, to provide a deferral of STC as opposed to a loss of STC.  In my opinion, 
such a warning would be both specific enough to cover any loss of tax occasioned 
by section 44 of the ITA, and general enough to catch this change in nature from 
income to capital.  If such a warning was given, the Taxpayer’s right to legal 
certainty would not have been infringed, and the Taxpayer’s expensive legal 
advisors would have advised it of the risk of its distribution being subjected to 
tax.158  
 
As a side point however, I have to point out that it is unfortunate that in the present 
matter, the Taxpayer’s objective was to achieve a bona fide BEE element into its 
ownership.159 The only way that this could be possible in the present matter was 
if the share price was affordable to the prospective BEE buyers, which could only 
be done if the Taxpayer (the resultant company after the amalgamation 
transaction) distributed the income tied up in its share premium account.160 It is 
truly unfortunate that STC was levied on this distribution, since the distribution 
was aimed at enabling the empowerment of vulnerable and needy black South 
Africans.  
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Moreover, when considering the considerable distance between the initial 
warning proposing the withdrawal of section 44(9) of the ITA, as opposed to the 
actual final enactment, which inserted a new section 44(9A), Fabricius J reasoned 
through his decision to hold the Taxpayer ex post facto liable for STC on its 
voluntary distribution by stating that if SARS had nevertheless implemented its 
original plan of withdrawing section 44(9) of the ITA, that the amalgamated 
company’s distribution of the consideration shares to its shareholders would in 
any event have been subjected to STC.161 Fabricius J went further to state that the 
net effect of the actual change on the other hand was merely that the amalgamated 
company would no longer be held liable for STC on its consideration shares, but 
rather that the Taxpayer (the resultant company) now became liable on the 
distribution of its newly acquired share premium.162 To me, this reasoning 
completely misses the point.  
 
The right to legal certainty enables citizens generally to know and to predict their 
rights on an upfront basis with precision in order for them to know and understand 
what the law prescribes, and how to plan their conduct accordingly to attract the 
least amount of tax possible.163 In line with this principle, if the final enactment 
maintained the exemption of section 44(9) in the ITA, as initially proposed in the 
Budget Speech and press release statement of 21 February 2007, would the 
Taxpayer’s right to legality certainty have been upheld, as it would have been 
given ample warning of the prospective change being implemented 
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retrospectively. In accordance with Davis J’s commentary, the Taxpayer’s 
‘expensive legal advisors’ would in this regard have advised it that regardless of 
it acting bona fide to achieve a BEE ownership objective, that their distribution 
would most definitely have been ex post facto subjected to STC.164 Here, I would 
have agreed that the Taxpayer would have been given ample notice of the 
prospective change and that it should have been held liable for the payment of 
STC on the distribution of its consideration shares. However, when we consider 
values under the right to legal certainty, we cannot justify holding the Taxpayer 
liable for STC under section 44(9A) of the ITA merely because it would in any 
event have been liable for STC if the initial withdrawal of section 44(9) of the 
ITA had been given effect to. While the latter was that which was warned of in 
the forewarnings, and that which accordingly upheld the values espoused in the 
Rule of Law, the former amendment was not warned of, and did accordingly not 
comply with the values espoused by the Rule of law.    
 
Furthermore, in relation to the extensive foreign law authorities cited as 
persuasive authority as guidance for the court, I was left flabbergasted as to how 
Fabricius J just randomly cited foreign cases that clearly disregarded the Rule of 
Law.165 An example hereof was in his consideration of the Taxpayer’s 
interpretational argument, where he cited the Supreme Court of Canada where it 
was stated as follows: 
[N]o one has a vested right to continuance of the law as it stood in the past; in tax law 
it is imperative that legislation conform to changing social needs and governmental 
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policy. A taxpayer may plan his financial affairs in reliance on the tax laws remaining 
the same; he takes the risk that the legislation may be changed. 166  
 
As if this wasn’t bold enough, Fabricuis J took this idea further and condoned a 
similar principle from the American Supreme Court where Justice Blackmun stated 
that ‘tax legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the 
Internal Revenue Code’.167 In this regard, it was stated that retrospective changes 
may seem to be unfair to certain persons or institutions, but that in the context of tax 
statutes specifically, that the fiscus needed to be flexible to be able to function 
effectively by taking into account changing demands of society.168 This clearly gives 
one the impression that the Rule of Law seems to be applied differently depending 
on the person claiming its protection.   
 
Taking this argument further, the proposition put forward by Hattingh was that while 
there was an extensive list of cited authorities from all around the globe, there was 
no general rule that prohibited tax legislation, and that any authority was cited 
regardless of whether it undermined our Rule of Law principle or not.169 
Furthermore, I agree with his contention that there was no method set out for 
analysing such extensive comparative foreign law authorities, and that it seemed to 
be a random choice of whatever authorities supported the parties’ stance.170 Hattingh 
states further that instead of the mere juxta positioning of such extensive list of 
foreign law authorities that the court should have honed in on the position of German 
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law, as South African post-apartheid constitutional order was modelled on the 
German constitutional dispensation.171 
 
I agree with this contention, and similar to the position in South Africa, Fabricius J 
discussed Germany’s ban on the retrospective application of legislation, with certain 
exceptions.172 However, when considering Davis J consideration of the German Law 
position regarding such retrospective application of legislation, this is not necessarily 
favourable to the Taxpayer’s argument.173   Here Davis J considers jurisprudence 
from the German Constitutional court which sets out the difference between 
retroactivity and retrospectivity.  A statute, in this regard, has retroactive effect when 
it applies to transactions that would be completed before the new Act came into 
effect, and the law would alter the legal consequences before it came into existence. 
Retrospectivity applies when the new law applies to transactions that have begun but 
that which have not yet been finalised.174 Here, the court goes on the assumption that 
retroactive laws are prohibited, while the retrospective counterpart is generally 
permitted. However, a further nuance that Davis J highlighted was in the context of 
specifically defined and designated tax years, where retroactivity only applies if the 
law being considered is passed in the following year; that is to say that it will apply 
to the previous tax year regardless of when in that year it was introduced. 175 
Applying this to the present case, Davis J argued that the Taxpayer in the present 
matter’s ‘entire saga’ took place within the same tax year, and that this particular 
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distinction drawn by the German jurisprudence would be fatal for the Taxpayer’s 
argument. 176 
 
Moreover, the constitutional right to legal certainty in the law affords taxpayers have 
a well-established right to know what the law proposes and then to arrange their 
affairs in a manner that would attract the least amount of tax possible’.177 Based on 
this principle, and in accordance with the considerable distance between the initial 
warning and the final enactment, I have to disagree with Davis J’s view that the 
Taxpayer ought to have known that the final amendment would have affected their 
amalgamation transaction in some or other way, and that if they really did not know 
that such amendment would have affected their transaction, that their legal advisors 
should have known, and should have advised them accordingly. When considering 
how different the initial warning was compared to the final amendment, I do not 
believe that the Taxpayer or their legal advisors should have been concerned with 
the subsequent voluntary distribution of the resultant company’s share premium. In 
any event, as mentioned above, this share premium is of a capital nature and not a 
dividend as defined for income tax purposes.  To expect this of the Taxpayer would 
go completely against the principle of legal certainty and would in essence require 
the Taxpayer to structure their affairs based on a hypothetical situation that might or 
might not have materialised. Instead, acting upon legal advice, the Taxpayer took 
into consideration the existing law at the time, as well as the warnings that section 
44(9) of the ITA would be withdrawn because the compulsory distribution led to a 
loss of STC as opposed to a mere deferral thereof, and structured its affairs in a way 
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that would achieve its BEE objective with the least amount of tax possible.178 I 
therefore believe that any competent legal advisor would have advised the Taxpayer 
to go-ahead with its transaction without the concern that their transaction would be 
subjected to STC. 
 
In this present case, after having considered all the relevant contextual and factual 
background, I believe the court correctly applied the rationality test as it is the test 
to apply when the law in question does not infringe upon rights espoused in the Bill 
of Rights, and because it is the standard which applies to all legislation under the 
Rule of Law as entrenched in section 1(c) of the Constitution.179 More importantly, 
it is this enquiry that is used to decide whether an action passes constitutional muster 
in terms of the Rule of Law doctrine.  
 
In accordance with the Taxpayer’s argument before the court, I do not believe that 
any warning was given to the Taxpayer prior to the final enactment of in August 
2007. Here, I disagree with Davis J who is of the opinion that sufficient warning was 
given to the Taxpayer of the relevant taxing authorities’ intention to address the 
unintended loss of STC caused by section 44, particularly by the Minister of Finance 
in his Budget Speech of 21 February 2007, and then again in a press release on the 
same day.180 On this basis, and alongside the right of taxpayers generally to legal 
certainty, I am of the opinion that the retrospective application of section 44(9A) of 
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the ITA is unconstitutional, and that should this matter be taken on appeal that there 
would be a high probability of the current decision being overturned.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR    
4. Conclusion: 
 
As can be seen from above, the Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd case is of great importance 
in our constitutional dispensation as it is anticipated to be the test case on the 
constitutionality of retrospective tax legislation, particularly regarding the technique 
the court used to work through the retrospective tax law changes, and the way it fixed 
the effective date of future amending legislation by press release.181 In this regard, the 
case provided us with guidance and jurisprudence in an area in South African tax law 
that is already plagued with much debate and uncertainty.182 
 
From the above we see that the amalgamated company main intention was to introduce 
a BEE element of ownership into its company in a tax efficient manner. Upon 
consulting their legal experts they were advised that the best manner in which they 
could achieve this objective was to enter into an amalgamation agreement in terms of 
                                                          
181Johan Hattingh op cit note 78 at 290. 
182Brink, J and Brincker, E op cit note 2.  
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section 44 of the ITA. At this particular time, the law was structured in a way in which 
it was possible to achieve this objective in a tax efficient matter, particularly because 
any distribution made by parties to the amalgamation transaction would be tax free. 
The problem however was that the taxing authorities never intended the section 44 of 
the ITA amalgamation process to be STC free, and instead intended a temporary 
deferral thereof. To address this, the taxing authorities accordingly started putting 
mechanisms in place to limit the loss of such STC.183 With hindsight however, the 
reality was that there existed considerable distance between the fore-warnings given 
by the taxing officials and the final enactment, as the forewarnings warned taxpayers 
that they intended on withdrawing the STC exemption, while the actual enactment 
retained this exemption and instead unusually sought to tax a voluntary subsequent 
distribution made by the resultant company to the amalgamation transaction.184 The 
Taxpayer’s problem in the present matter arose in 2011 when SARS sought to tax the 
Taxpayer on its May 2007 completed transaction, particularly its distribution of its 
share premium at the time. In addition to this assessment, SARS furthermore also 
levied interest on such outstanding STC payment from 8 August 2007, the date on 
which the final enactment was promulgated into law. This was that which accordingly 
prompted the Taxpayer to bring its matter before the High Court. Here, the prime relief 
sought by the Taxpayer was an order of constitutional invalidity, while the second 
order, couched as an alternative to the first was an interpretational argument which 
had the effect that section 44(9A) of the ITA did not apply to Taxpayer’s distribution 
when it was made because it was a completed transaction. 185  The gist of the 
                                                          
183Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 443.  
 
184Ibid. 
185Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd supra note 4 at 443. 
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Taxpayer’s constitutional issue requested of the court to declare that the provision did 
not pass constitutional muster to the extent of its retrospectivity.  
 
Furthermore, one of the important factor highlighted by this analysis was the fact that 
context is everything in legal disputes.186 On this basis Davis J argued that while a 
vaguely drafted press release could in one context be argued to be not to be justified, 
the same press release could under different circumstances, be justified. This is of 
particular importance against the backdrop of fluidity and flexibility generally 
demanded by our economic circumstances. In this regard, and after having considered 
all the relevant facts of this case, alongside the values espoused in the Rule of Law 
doctrine within our constitutional dispensation, we see that the content of the 
forewarnings, and the subsequent content of the Draft Bill of 27 February 2007, was 
paramount to my decision that the court incorrectly held in favour of SARS. In 
agreement with Hattingh that there existed considerable distance between the initial 
warnings and the final enactment.187 On this basis, and in disagreeing with Davis J, I 
argued that it was as if no warning at all was given to the taxpayers that section 44(9) 
of the ITA would be changed in the manner in which it was, and more particularly 
that such amendment would be retrospective in its operation. From my point of view, 
this goes completely against citizens and taxpayer’s rights to legal certainty, and 
accordingly violates the Rule of Law.  
Furthermore, in conformance with the Taxpayer’s approach, I agree that regardless of 
the existence of a general presumption against the retrospective application of 
legislation that there could exist exceptions to this rule that will not attract 
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constitutional sanction.188 Here I believe that against the backdrop of fluidity required 
by our government for the effective running of our country that one such exception 
would be if a proper warning of such change in the law was given and that such change 
would be made retrospective. The extent and detail of such warning is however 
debatable, but in the present case, I believe that following the general forewarning of 
10 January 2007, that if the warning of the 21 February 2007 contained a further 
general warning that warned taxpayers that because section 44 of the ITA allowed a 
loss of tax as opposed to a mere deferral thereof, that the taxing authorities intended 
on aligning such provision with their initial intention, that I would have been more 
inclined to argue that it was general enough to cover any types of loss of tax, and 
specific enough to loss occasioned by section 44 of the ITA, in order to conform with 
the Rule of Law. If this were the case, would legal advisors have warned the Taxpayer 
of the risk entailed in proceeding with their transaction. To me, this warning would 
have accorded with the right to legal certainty and would accordingly have passed 
constitutional muster.  
Furthermore, I agree with Hattingh’s contentions that the case gave off the impression 
that the Rule of Law existed to protect the state against corporate citizens, and that it 
was as if the doctrine was a mere adornment in our constitutional democracy.189 At 
this point, tax morality comes to the fore, which term is based on an agreement 
between the government and its citizens that in exchange for its protection and 
accountable governing, that taxpayers would pay their taxes. In accordance with Davis 
J’ views however, I agree that this judgment does not help our current problematic 
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status of tax morality, particularly because of the non-conformist matter in which the 
court dealt with the Rule of Law, and the values espoused thereby.   
Furthermore, I agree with Emslie that the Taxpayer did not ‘exploit’ and act 
unscrupulously when it made use of the so-called ‘loophole’ in the law at the time, 
and that such argument is fundamentally flawed. In the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue v King,190 Schreiner JA stated that there exists a ‘general scope of the Act’, 
which is expanded when the act is amended. Here he explained that this did not mean 
that a ‘loophole’ which previously existed implied that the Act meant something other 
than what was stated and that taxpayers took advantage of this provision in order to 
subvert what was intended all along. Taxpayers are well within their rights to arrange 
their affairs in a manner in which they can pay the least amount of tax possible.  
Furthermore, I noted that it is unfortunate the Taxpayer’s objective in the present matter 
was merely to achieve a bona fide BEE element into its ownership,191 and the only way 
that this could have been possible was if the share price was affordable to the 
prospective BEE buyers. This could only have been done if the Taxpayer (the resultant 
company after the amalgamation transaction) distributed the income tied up in its share 
premium account.192  
 
It is unfortunate the Taxpayer in this particular case opted not to appeal its loss to the 
Constitutional Court as the expected costs that it would have incurred would have 
outweighed it’s tax liability.193  
 
                                                          
1901947(2) SA 196 (A). 
191Johan Hattingh op cit note 78 at 289. 
192Ibid at 290. 
193Ibid. 
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In the light of the above, I am of the view that should this matter be taken on appeal 
that there would be a high probability of the current decision being overturned. 
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